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Since early 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has increasingly 
recruited Western Muslim men and women to its radical ideology. This thesis examines 
why Western European Muslim women—specifically from France and Great Britain—
are voluntarily migrating to ISIL territory to support Islamic extremism. It evaluates 
women’s involvement in previous terrorist movements and proposes five potential 
motivations for migration: grievances toward Western society, ideology, 
relationships/belonging, identity assertion, and targeted recruitment. Through the analysis 
of eleven case studies and numerous social media accounts, this thesis demonstrates that 
European Muslim women choose life in ISIL territory for a variety of reasons. It also 
illustrates, however, that ISIL’s social media and propaganda campaigns are the strongest 
forces pushing women toward radicalization and migration. Finally, this paper concludes 
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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
According to Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was established in 2006 after the death of Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Since its inception, ISI has 
fought to establish a Caliphate, or Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. Like al-Zarqawi, ISI 
adheres to a strict interpretation of Islam and believes it has a duty to purge the world of 
apostates, or nonbelievers. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of ISI. In 
April 2013, he joined forces with Sunni Muslims in Syria to create the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).1 
Tactically proficient and brutally violent, ISIL made immediate territorial claims 
in northern Syria. Laub and Masters explain that in December 2013, the organization 
opened a front in Anbar Province, Iraq, and by January 2014, it had captured Fallujah. 
Five months later, ISIL victoriously claimed Mosul, Iraq’s second most populous city. 
For two years, Western military forces, Shia Muslims, the Iraqi military, and local 
governments have tried to suppress the radical group. To date, however, ISIL remains 
tactically strong, well-funded, and popular among Islamic extremists.2  
Increased numbers of European Muslims are accepting fundamentalist principles 
and migrating to the Middle East to join the ranks of ISIL. According to the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, approximately 550 Western Muslim women have migrated to Iraq 
and Syria to support ISIL and the formation of the Caliphate.3 Their stories—and 
Western nations’ subsequent fears—inundate newspapers, magazines, and social media 
websites. The phenomenon of female terrorists, however, is not new. Groups such as the 
Black Widows in Chechnya and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have participated in 
                                                 
1 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “The Islamic State,” CFR Backgrounders (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Alexandra Bradford, Ross Frenett, and Carolyn Hoyle, “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants 
to ISIS,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, (January 2015): 8. 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF. 
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religious and political terrorism for decades, serving as suicide bombers, ideological 
supporters, and group organizers. There are many scholarly arguments as to why women 
choose to participate in terrorist activity. Dr. Mia Bloom, a professor of Security Studies 
at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, states, “Many people have assumed that 
women could not consciously choose to participate in terrorism of their own volition. We 
need to work past gender stereotypes and begin to examine the conditions that really 
influence female violence.”4 
Western Muslim women’s support for ISIL differs from previous cases of female 
extremists, however, making it a unique study of motivations. Historically, women were 
personally connected to war and injustice in places such as Chechnya, Palestine, and Sri 
Lanka. They were the victims of horrific violence and personal loss on a daily basis; thus, 
it is easy to understand their depression, anger, and desires for revenge via terrorism. To 
sustain the Caliphate, ISIL must lure Muslims from all over the world to the battlefield. 
They must connect Western citizens to the pain and suffering in the Middle East. 
Consequently, they developed remarkably successful recruitment and propaganda 
campaigns that the West has been unable to combat. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why are Western European Muslim women supporting ISIL? In this thesis, I 
specifically examine cases of French and British Muslim women who have migrated to 
Iraq and Syria. France and Britain have two of the largest Muslim populations in Western 
Europe. According to the Pew Research Center, 7.5 percent of the French population is 
Muslim—the largest percentage in Western Europe; moreover, approximately 5 percent 
of the British population is Muslim.5 Thus, it is important to comprehend why women 
reject Western society for violent extremism. 
                                                 
4 Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011), preface.  




C. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
Understanding why Western Muslim women migrate to ISIL is a matter of 
European and American national security. Since September 11, 2001, terrorism and 
national security have been at the forefront of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. 
According to the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), five countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria—housed 82 percent of all terrorist attacks in 2013.6 
Moreover, the Syrian Civil War and the ISIL campaign contributed to recent spikes in 
terrorist violence.7 The movement of Western Muslim citizens to top GTI states concerns 
parent governments who anticipate security threats upon their return. 
Terrorist activity is continuously studied and analyzed around the world. Marc 
Sageman, a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, stresses that only a 
thorough understanding of terrorist organizations “will enable the world to mount an 
effective defense.”8 ISIL is a terrorist organization that poses a significant threat to 
Western democracies. To eliminate this threat, scholars and politicians must understand 
all aspects of it—including the roles and motivations of women. Since terrorism is often 
perceived as a man’s domain, the role of women is frequently overlooked or 
understated.9 In reality, however, women support extremism in numerous ways, making 
it rational and prudent for ISIL to recruit females.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
My research sought to explain why Western European Muslim women migrate to 
the Middle East to support ISIL and Islamic extremism. Since each woman’s story 
varied, it was often difficult to pinpoint a single motive or reason. Therefore, through 
case analysis, I looked for common themes, factors, or events that drove these women 
toward ISIL’s ideology and radicalization.  
                                                 
6 Institute for Economics and Peace. “Global Terrorism Index,” accessed January 30, 2015, 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Terrorism-Index-Report-2014.pdf.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), vii.  
9 Katharina Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
30, no 5 (March 2007): 398, accessed October 17, 2014, doi: 10.1080/10576100701258585.  
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My research was qualitative in nature and focused on historical and current 
observations, events, and stories. I developed my hypotheses through past case study 
analysis that examined women’s motivations for supporting terrorism. I reviewed various 
primary and secondary sources including documented interviews, journal and newspaper 
articles, academic books, social media venues, and research websites.  
E. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Western European Muslim women continue to migrate to the Middle East to 
support ISIL. Current events, though, are often difficult to assess because the parameters 
consistently evolve. Thus, my research is merely a starting point intended to highlight the 
problem and its roots in hopes that others can develop solutions.  
Female involvement in terrorism fascinates the West, so there were plenty of 
articles, stories, and editorials on the subject. A research limitation, however, was finding 
complete case studies of British and French defectors. Western governments have been 
slow to address this problem and to identify, detain, and question these women—making 
it difficult to compile complete, credible accounts. As such, several of the cases 
referenced in this thesis were pulled from online news sources and professional reports. 
Social media, heavily used by ISIL supporters, unfortunately lacks certain elements of 
totality and reliability. Most social media messages contain probable reasons for 
migration, yet do not address personal stories that shed light on the path to radicalization.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Why are Western European Muslim women supporting ISIL? This thesis 
proposes five reasons: grievances with the West, ideology, belonging and purpose, 
identity, and recruitment. It ultimately concludes that women’s motives for supporting 
violent extremism are varied and complex. One factor, however, remains fundamental: 
propaganda. ISIL runs a sophisticated media campaign that actively recruits men and 
women from the West. Its propaganda penetrates the hearts and minds of young Muslims 
around the world—prompting them to abandon family, education, and employment to 
support violent extremism in war-torn regions of the Middle East. 
 5 
This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter II provides an overview of ISIL, 
explains why and how it recruits Western women, and includes a thorough analysis of 
ISIL’s propaganda campaign. Chapter III dissects five potential reasons for Western 
women’s migrations to the Middle East. Chapter IV introduces specific case studies of 
French and British female migrants. It analyzes their backgrounds for obvious motives 
for radicalization or migration. It then reviews migrants’ social media accounts to 
examine women’s self-identified objectives and to better understand the allure of ISIL’s 
recruitment propaganda. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that women’s motivations 
for supporting ISIL vary; however, the organization’s online recruitment campaign—
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II. WHY AND HOW IS ISIL RECRUITING WESTERN MUSLIM 
WOMEN? 
This chapter seeks to explain why and how ISIL is recruiting Western European 
Muslim women. It starts with background information that outlines ISIL’s origins, 
beliefs, and objectives. Focused on its primary goal—survival of the Caliphate—ISIL 
recruits Western European Muslim women for practical purposes: community building, 
marriage, procreation, and recruitment. It generates propaganda—disseminated via the 
Internet and social media—that specifically targets Western women and incites feelings 
of duty, empathy, and passion for the Islamic State.  
ISIL’s use of social media has been extremely successful in radicalizing and 
recruiting Western European Muslims. Social media disseminates mass quantities of 
information and unites and motivates large groups of people. Alarmingly, it also 
disguises radical activists, skews reality, and affects decision making. Consequently, 
many extremists are bred online, and as technology rapidly extends to developing 
regions, Internet platforms become more prevalent and powerful. Thus, it is imperative to 
study their impacts on radicalization and decision-making.  
A. THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The Islamic State is a militant organization that started approximately ten years 
ago. Its roots are traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI). Zarqawi was a brutal fighter who ruthlessly attacked infidels, such as American 
troops and Muslims who failed to adopt his extremist views.10 Zarqawi’s interpretation of 
Islam included strict adherence to takfiri doctrine—condemning people, including 
Muslims, as apostates or non-believers because of their sins.11 Following Zarqawi’s death 
in 2006, AQI members established the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).12 To date, the Islamic 
                                                 
10 Laub and Masters, “Islamic State.” 
11 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” Atlantic, March 2015, 8. 
12 Laub and Masters, “Islamic State.” 
 8 
State, like Zarqawi, believes its duty is to purge the world of apostates.13 ISI was initially 
weakened by the 2007 surge of American troops.14 In 2010, however, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi assumed control of ISI and revitalized it.15 In April 2013, Baghdadi merged 
Sunni forces in Iraq and Syria to form the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).16  
According to Laub and Masters, ISIL’s expansion was fueled by Sunni 
marginalization in Iraq and Syria. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Shia 
majority excluded the Sunni minority from national politics. Hence, the Iraqi 
government’s corruption and prejudice fueled ISIL’s will to fight for territory. 
Concurrently, the civil war between the Assad government and the Sunni opposition 
created a power vacuum in which Shia, Sunni, and ISIL forces all fought for territory in 
Syria.17 
In June 2014, after seizing Mosul and Tikrit, the Islamic State declared itself a 
Caliphate, a political and religious government ruled by a descendant of the Prophet 
Muhammed and trusted to lead all Muslims. ISIL presently occupies territory in eastern 
Syria and northern and Western Iraq. Moreover, Islamic militant groups in North Africa, 
West Africa, and South Asia have declared allegiance to the organization and adopted its 
radical ideology.18 
ISIL’s ideology preaches Islamic extremism and frequently emphasizes the 
pending apocalypse and Day of Judgment.19 The Day of Judgment refers to the Muslim 
belief in personal accountability. Man’s fate in the afterlife is based on his submission to 
God and his contributions to the world. Adhering to a strict interpretation of the holy text, 
ISIL rejects peace with apostates and promotes an environment incapable of change.20 
                                                 
13 Wood, “ISIS Wants,” 9. 
14 Laub and Masters, “Islamic State.” 
15 Wood, “ISIS Wants,” 2. 
16 Laub and Masters, “Islamic State.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Wood, “ISIS Wants,” 3. 
20 Ibid., 2–3. 
 9 
Followers pledge allegiance (bay’a) to the Caliphate.21 The Caliph, or religious and 
political leader, must be a Sunni Muslim Qurayshi—descendent of the Prophet 
Muhammed’s tribe, Quraysh.22 The Caliph must own territory and govern it according to 
Sharia law.23 Baghdadi, the Caliphate’s current leader, is purportedly the eighth true 
Caliph.24  
Muslim communities worldwide debate the legitimacy of ISIL’s interpretation of 
Islam, especially when its followers behead infidels, rape women, slaughter children, 
burn prisoners, recruit adolescent soldiers, and destroy ancient cities and artifacts. Dr. 
Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, argues that 
ISIL’s extremist beliefs are rooted in Islamic genealogy. Haykel acknowledges that the 
Islamic State is a minority group that does not properly represent the religion. He 
contends, however, that it adheres to many old tenets of Islam. It uses religious text in a 
very literal sense and intentionally ignores the faith’s nonviolent messages. Its goal is to 
establish a Caliphate; thus, its battles are modeled after campaigns from the early days of 
Islam. In many cases, the Islamic State’s actions are grounded in the Quran, traditions of 
the Prophet, and practices of past generations. These include punishments for apostasy, 
such as beheading and burning.25  
Many Muslims, however, reject Dr. Haykel’s research. Arsalan Iftikhar, Senior 
Editor of the Islamic Monthly, refers to ISIL as “The Un-Islamic State.”26 He asserts, 
“There is nothing Islamic about beheading foreign journalists, indiscriminately targeting 
religious minorities, and instilling wanton terror within the general civilian population 
where your terrorist thugs operate.”27 Referencing the peaceful teachings of the Prophet 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 16. 
22 Ibid., 15–17. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid., 22. 
25 Bernard Haykel, “A Lot of Muslims are Embarrassed by ISIS,” February 23, 2015, Anderson 
Cooper 360, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/02/23/ac-bernard-haykel-on-isis.cnn. 




Muhammed, Iftikhar explains that the Muslims who kill in the name of Islam are 
completely tarnishing the essence of the faith.28 Even President Obama proclaimed that 
ISIL was hiding behind a false Islam. In his address to the United Nations General 
Assembly on September 24, 2014, President Obama denounced the Islamic State and 
declared, “There can be no reasoning—no negotiation—with this brand of evil.”29 
Whether or not their actions are ideologically warranted, ISIL will continue its terror until 
its objectives are met.  
B. ISIL’S OBJECTIVES 
ISIL has a political objective: the Caliphate. At present, its principal goal is 
survival. It needs to retain and expand its territory; yet, external forces—including other 
Muslim organizations—are determined to see it collapse. Moreover, ISIL’s failure to 
negotiate with other states and recognize international borders has severely limited its 
future.30 Graeme Wood, journalist and lecturer in Political Science at Yale University, 
explains, “If it [the Islamic State] loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will 
cease to be a Caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because 
territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those 
oaths of allegiance are no longer binding.”31 The Caliphate’s development and its will to 
fight are critical.32 Wood explains, “With every month that it fails to expand, it resembles 
less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammed than yet another Middle Eastern 
government failing to bring prosperity to its people.”33  
The Caliphate must preserve and increase its territory and safeguard the jihadist 
community for future generations. ISIL needs people to accomplish its mission. Thus, 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General 
Assembly,” White House Press Secretary, September 24, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly. 
30 Wood, “ISIS Wants,” 27, 30. 
31 Ibid., 30. 
32 Ibid., 26. 
33 Ibid., 31–32. 
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after its official declaration of statehood, ISIL strengthened its recruitment campaign, and 
Western women became key targets of the organization’s propaganda.34 
C. WHY AND HOW IS ISIL RECRUITING WESTERN MUSLIM WOMEN? 
ISIL lures Western women to the Caliphate for practical purposes: to build an 
Islamic society through marriage and procreation and to recruit other women via the 
Internet. How? Dr. Haykel refers to the organization as an “unbelievably powerful media 
machine.”35 ISIL understands its audience in the West and distributes propaganda that 
satisfies its requirements. Its recruitment campaign has been extremely successful; thus, it 
is important to examine its key tools—the Internet and social media—and their effects on 
radicalization and decision making. 
1. To Build an Islamic State 
ISIL is focused on survival of the Caliphate and maintaining its current 
momentum in Iraq and Syria. To persist, it needs a society that gradually matures and 
obtains allegiance from Muslims all over the world.36 Emily Daglish, a research assistant 
for the Human Security Centre, states, “The desire to form a Caliphate comes with 
practicalities, notably the need for ‘support’ functions, such as increasing the population 
and establishing communities and home lives that can keep particularly foreign fighters 
engaged in the region.”37 Supporting roles are primarily undertaken by women, including 
those from the West. 
Two critical aspects of building and sustaining an Islamic society are marriage 
and procreation. According to Dr. Mia Bloom, many foreign fighters are promised one or 
more wives in ISIL territory.38 The promises of family and employment explain why 
                                                 
34 Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, “‘Til Martyrdom Do Us Part’” Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue, May 2015, 17, 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf . 
35 Bernard Haykel, “Embarrassed by ISIS.“ 
36 Wood, “ISIS Wants,” 14–16. 
37 Emily Daglish, “Recruitment to ISIS: No Longer a Man’s Game,” Human Security Centre Policy 
Brief 3, no. 1 (March 2015), 1. 
38 Mia Bloom, “How ISIS Is Using Marriage as a Trap,” Huffington Post, March 2, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mia-bloom/isis-marriage-trap_b_6773576.html. 
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countless men have flocked to support the Caliphate. For their allegiance, ISIL provides 
housing, jobs, wives, and slaves, and encourages reproduction by paying for every child 
born in the Islamic State.39 Many Western fighters do not speak Arabic and prefer wives 
that speak their native languages.40 Thus, Western women are invaluable assets that keep 
men committed to ISIL’s jihad via marriage.  
To recruit Western women, ISIL promises “devout, jihadist husbands, a home in a 
true Islamic state and the opportunity to devote their lives to their religion and their god,” 
which fuels the desire “to become a ‘founding mother’ to a new nation.”41 It romanticizes 
life in the Caliphate and publicizes that it values and supports its female force.
42
 The 
image of a utopian world is complete with stories and pictures of women sharing home-
cooked meals, bathing in the Euphrates River, and raising children together.43 Moreover, 
ISIL propaganda emphasizes belonging to an ideological society. Emily Daglish notes, 
“The notion of an ‘ideologically pure state,’ living honorably alongside one’s sisters 
whilst being closer to god appeals to women and girls who are seeking adventure and see 
the act as heroic.”44 In addition to the appeals of marriage, belonging, and adventure, 
many Western Muslim women migrate due to pressure from other female recruits.  
2. To Recruit Others via Social Media 
In addition to domestic responsibilities, ISIL uses Western women to recruit other 
women because they are well versed in social media.45 According to Erin Saltman and 
Melanie Smith, counter-terrorism researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
“When the declaration of the so-called Caliphate was announced in 2014, ISIS developed 
a unique jihadist strategy that immediately recognized the importance of bringing women 
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more actively into propaganda and recruitment efforts.”46 As demonstrated in Chapter IV, 
ISIL encourages women to recruit by grooming “their victims online” via social media.47 
They instruct recruiters to build relationships, listen, answer questions, and provide 
support to potential followers.48 Ultimately, ISIL hopes female migrants can reach 
friends and family back home. If they are unable to encourage migration, they hope to 
inspire terrorist attacks on Western soil.49 
Using the Internet and social media to recruit is most effective where it is most 
prevalent—in the West. Therefore, the next section details the importance of propaganda, 
outlines how the Internet makes users more vulnerable to radical ideas, and explains the 
impacts of social media on radicalization and decision making.  
D. PROPAGANDA AND RECRUITMENT 
The significance of propaganda in contemporary hostilities cannot be overstated. 
According to the American Historical Association, military force is not enough to win 
wars. Modern-day war is a mixture of military, political, economic, and propaganda or 
information operations.50 States need to “intimidate enemy leaders, to separate them from 
their people, and to break down resistance by producing evidence that the mass of the 
enemy people have been deceived and misled.”51 Propaganda promotes a war effort by 
reaching millions of people; garnering social, political, and economic support; and 
demoralizing the enemy.52 The propagandist undermines the enemy’s will to fight by 
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illustrating the moral superiority of its cause and only broadcasting information and 
military victories from its point of view.53  
Propaganda plays an integral role in radicalizing and luring young Western 
European women to the Middle East. In “Women of the Islamic State,” published in 
February 2015, the authors assert, “IS propaganda is always carefully honed to a 
particular target audience . . . all the videos and photo reports that make it into Western 
media are intended to find a home there.”54 In addition to positive images of duty, family, 
and utopia, ISIL’s propaganda incites feelings of anger, vengeance, and fear. It solidifies 
that Islam has been persecuted violently by “non-believers” throughout history.55 
Jihadists want Muslims to believe that the West, particularly the United States, yearns for 
a modern-day Crusade.
56
 Moreover, ISIL instills fear through images of the apocalypse, 
an event that many supporters joyfully anticipate and imply will come very soon.
57
  
Unlike its predecessors, ISIL has mastered its use of social media and 
propaganda. Extremist organizations competing for Muslims’ allegiance, such as Al 
Qaeda, have been slow to catch up. Al Qaeda, founded in the 1980s, has never been 
concerned with the immediate formation of a Caliphate, so it has waged jihad 
differently.58 Whereas ISIL immediately developed an active recruitment strategy, Al 
Qaeda adopted a more passive method. It believed that successful attacks against the 
West would attract followers who wanted a global Muslim movement.59 Therefore, it 
focused on large scale attacks against its Western enemies—principally the United 
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States.60 Since September 11, however, Al Qaeda has been weakened by its inability to 
execute another large, successful attack against the West.61  
When Al Qaeda did recruit, its campaign involved written statements from Osama 
bin Laden and “bland, made-for-tv proselytizing.”62 Hence, it is easy to identify the key 
to ISIL’s success. In Al-Qaeda vs. ISIS: The Battle For the Soul of Jihad, Daniel Byman, 
a research director of Middle Eastern studies at the Brookings Institute, and Jennifer 
Williams, a research assistant at the Brookings Institute, declare, “Which do you think is 
more likely to attract the attention of an 18-year-old boy dreaming of adventure and 
glory: a badass video with CGI flames and explosions, or a two-hour lecture on the Koran 
from a gray-haired old man?”63 
Studying ISIL’s recruitment strategies, Yaroslav Trofimov, journalist for the Wall 
Street Journal, notes striking similarities between ISIL supporters and Western European 
communist sympathizers in the 1970s and 1980s. Like the utopian Caliphate, communist 
promises of welfare, social justice, and “a better, fairer, and purer society”64 attracted 
many young people. Hence, a notable achievement of the Islamic State “is its capacity to 
touch a similar nerve with its own utopian vision today, attracting the bored idealists, the 
misfits, and the adventurers from across Europe.”65 Today, many Western European 
citizens search for purpose and belonging on the Internet, making it a powerful 
radicalization and recruitment tool. 
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E. USE OF INTERNET 
Not surprisingly, extremists and terrorists are increasingly using the Internet to 
radicalize and recruit new members. According to Rachel Briggs Obe and Tanya 
Silverman, researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “One of the other striking 
features of ISIS is its mastery of online communication and propaganda; it is skillfully 
using the online space to get across its message.”66 While the Internet is not the only 
means of radicalization, it is becoming more powerful and prevalent, particularly in the 
West, because “it facilitates the formation of (virtual) communities which would be more 
‘risky,’ if not impossible, to establish in the real world.”67 Moreover, the Internet aids 
radicalization by desensitizing users to human suffering and emotion.68 According to Dr. 
Gary Small, a professor of psychiatry at the University of California Los Angeles 
(UCLA), and Gigi Vorgan, empathy is learned—often through face-to-face contact and 
physical interaction.69 Therefore, the more time individuals spend online—watching 
horrific videos, viewing inappropriate photos, conducting business, or socializing—the 
less emphatic they become.70 People that lack empathy more easily dehumanize their 
enemies and justify horrendous violence against them. 
A report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and 
Political Violence (ICSR) highlights three additional problematic aspects of the Internet 
in relation to radicalization and recruitment. First, extremists use the Internet to illustrate 
and reinforce their ideological message or narrative to recruits that can easily access 
powerful videos and imagery. Second, the Internet makes it easier for people to join 
extremist organizations because it remains a relatively safe way to meet and network with 
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others. Finally, the Internet creates an environment where radical views and behavior are 
acceptable.71  
Although Internet access has exponentially expanded worldwide, Western nations 
remain the primary consumers, making them increasingly vulnerable to online 
radicalization and extremism. Dr. Robin L. Thompson—a security, counterintelligence, 
and information operations specialist—confirms, “People living in the U.S. and other 
Western countries, where the Internet is available to the entire population, are more likely 
to be recruited and radicalized via the Internet.”72 Today, Internet Live Stats reports that 
nearly 40 percent of the world is connected to the Internet, compared to less than 1 
percent 20 years ago.73 In 2014, 89.9 percent of the British population had Internet 
access. This was followed by 85.75 percent of the French population.74 Although Internet 
user access in Middle Eastern countries increased an average 10 percent from 2013 to 
2014, they still severely trailed the West with only 26.6 percent in Syria, 7.79 percent in 
Iraq, and 5.95 percent in Afghanistan.75 As more people gain access to the Internet, 
however, they also gain access to social media platforms—increasing these tools’ 
popularity, power, and influence. 
1. Social Media 
ISIL operates an extremely sophisticated social media network that promotes its 
ideals, elicits fear, and expedites recruitment.76 In March 2015, J. M. Berger and 
Jonathon Morgan published a report for the Brookings Institute that studied ISIL’s use of 
Twitter in its recruitment campaign. “The ISIS Twitter Census” examined supporters’ 
Twitter accounts from September 2014 to December 2014. During this time, the authors 
estimate that ISIL communicated via approximately 46,000 accounts—not all active at 
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the same time.77 Each account had approximately 1,000 followers, significantly more 
than the average Twitter user.78 While the total number of ISIL followers on Twitter is 
relatively small, compared to its monthly user base of 284 million, Berger and Morgan 
declare, “ISIS supporters are still highly effective at getting their message out.”79 ISIL’s 
Twitter success can be attributed to somewhere between “500 and 2,000 accounts, which 
tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume.”80 Short bursts drive ISIL’s immense 
success of message dissemination on social media. The authors explain, “Short, 
prolonged bursts of activity cause hashtags to trend, resulting in third-party aggregation 
and insertion of tweeted content into search results.”81  
Since content is frequently violent and extremist, ISIL Twitter accounts are 
carefully monitored and regulated. Not surprisingly, however, ISIL supporters have 
adapted ways to avoid detection and public scrutiny. In December 2014, ISIL leaders 
ordered members to immediately disable the GPS on all mobile devices and banned 
iPhone products in the Islamic State for security purposes.82 With its official Twitter 
account suspended, ISIL maintains an exceptionally active presence by continuously 
creating smaller, less obvious accounts that fly under the radar.83 To avoid suspicious 
activity, many ISIL accounts only tweet a few times a week, distributing material via 
hashtags to information uploaded on websites.84 ISIL also uses a variety of apps and 
bots—pieces of computer software or third-party services that automatically spread or 
promote content, eliminating the need for a person to send a tweet—to discreetly share 
information.85  
                                                 
77 J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institute, March 2015), 7. 
78 Ibid., 30. 
79 Ibid., 31. 
80 Ibid., 3. 
81 Ibid., 29. 
82 Ibid., 11, 26. 




2. Social Media and Radicalization 
Activists use social media to raise awareness, increase motivation, and recruit 
others to their cause.86 While social media—applications such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube—does not cause radicalization or revolution, it can greatly influence the 
effectiveness of both by connecting people and disseminating large amounts of 
information.87 Through the instantaneous transfer of ideas, images, and commentary, 
social media intensifies news, increases support for revolutions and ideas, and provides 
activists an efficient means of command and control.88  
In “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Dr. Thompson outlines the pros 
and cons of social media outlets. She concludes that these applications are a “triple-edged 
sword” that slowly break down normal social behaviors in three key ways.89 First, social 
media applications generate “addictive information-seeking behaviors”90 in ardent users. 
Second, the anonymity of the Internet encourages users to share and report information 
that is normally kept private. Finally, unlimited access to information can manipulate 
users’ perceptions of the world.91 Furthermore, in 2011, bloggers examined the Egyptian 
revolution and three aspects of social media: the people connected to the issue, the 
sources distributing information, and the emotional perceptions of the situation. The 
study found that social media followers were pulling their information from multiple 
social media sources; moreover, they felt emotionally attached to the situation and 
inclined to get involved.92  
ISIL pursues a similar response from its followers: a strong, emotional attachment 
to extremist ideology and a desire to get involved. It baits people with its propaganda—
videos, pictures, stories—and creates the need for more information. It instills feelings of 
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belonging and purpose. In doing so, it ultimately manipulates followers’ perceptions of 
the world and alters their decisions. 
3. Social Media and Decision Making 
In addition to its role in radicalization, social media can impact decision making, 
increasing its overall influence and relevance. Dr. Daniel J. Power, professor of 
Management Information Systems at the University of Northern Iowa, and Dr. Gloria 
Phillips-Wren, professor of Information Systems at Loyola University Maryland, address 
how social media can alter opinions, influence choices, and impact decision making. 
Studying consumers and business managers, the authors determine that “People tend to 
trust the opinions of participants in online networks in which they have chosen to 
participate. Social media are rich information sources and these tools facilitate crowd 
behavior, increase peer pressure and may result in saturation and associated negative 
impacts.”93 
In the “Impact of Social Media and Web 2.0 on Decision-Making,” Power and 
Phillips-Wren reference studies conducted by Don Bulmer and Vanessa DiMauro in 2010 
and 2011. Bulmer and DiMauro identify 12 ways in which social media impacts CEO 
and business managers and disrupts traditional decision-making. Of note, the authors 
assert that people trust information obtained from social networks, and they seek input 
from their online peers when making decisions. Building on Bulmer and DiMauro’s 
research, Power and Phillips-Wren posit that social networks have a large impact on 
decision-making for several reasons; specifically, social media groups make decisions as 
“gangs” or “mobs” and act short of rational thought or planning.94 Sigmund Freud’s 
contagion crowd behavior theory contends “that people who are in a crowd act differently 
and are less aware of the true nature of their actions.”95 Thus, the crowd influences 
people’s behavior. In contrast, convergence theory affirms that like-minded people build 
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crowds.96 Whether contagion or convergence, social media unites groups of similar 
people that possess the potential to act senselessly.97  
Social media also generates new pressures to conform to group norms and 
standards. Power and Phillips-Wren declare that informational and normative conformity 
occur in social networks. Informational conformity refers to a decision maker who turns 
to his or her social network to attain accurate information. Normative conformity refers to 
a decision maker who conforms to a group’s ideals to be liked or accepted by others.98  
Clearly, social media works in ISIL’s favor. It unites like-minded individuals, 
provides a sense of belonging, and instills feelings of passion and purpose to a cause. It 
disseminates large quantities of extremist information in a relatively anonymous fashion. 
Additionally, people trust the opinions of online colleagues, friends, and networks—even 
if they have never met in person. As ISIL’s online presence increases, its support is likely 
to follow. As such, a counter-strategy from the West is vital. Absent any obstacles to their 
propaganda, extremist organizations will continue to use social media to recruit and 
motivate terrorist activity. 
F. LACK OF COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
The range and effects of social media are likely to increase in the future;99 thus, 
their links to radicalization and violent extremism must be consistently monitored to 
effectively counter the threats. The West acknowledges the need for narratives that refute 
ISIL propaganda; however, it has been slow to react and dedicate resources to the 
issue.100 In “Western Foreign Fighters,” Obe and Silverman declare, “Counter-narratives 
are a small and struggling cottage industry in comparison to ISIS’s high-tech production 
and distribution network.”101 Counter-narratives should disprove extremist ideas and 
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focus on the positive—what the West is for, not what it is against.102 Instead of 
challenging ISIL’s propaganda, however, the most common response of law enforcement 
and government officials is an attempt to remove extremist content from the Internet—an 
overwhelming and ineffective task due to the web’s vast and evolutionary nature.103 A 
more productive approach would increase the material—films, articles, rhetoric—that 
counteracts extremist measures.  
This chapter answered three main questions: Who is ISIL? ISIL is an extremist 
organization that adheres to a strict interpretation of Islam and lives by Sharia law. Why 
is it recruiting Western European Muslim women? ISIL must develop an Islamic society 
to maintain the Caliphate, and women serve practical roles. How is it recruiting them? 
ISIL is recruiting Western women via propaganda disseminated online. The “how” was 
broken down to show the value of the Internet, propaganda, and social media in targeted 
recruitment. This chapter illustrated how ISIL operates a successful recruitment 
campaign in Western Europe. The next chapter addresses why these women want to 
migrate to ISIL.  
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III. WHY WOULD WESTERN MUSLIM WOMEN SUPPORT 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM? 
The previous chapter explained why ISIL wants Western European women and 
how it uses social media to recruit and disseminate its propaganda. This chapter seeks to 
explain why Western European Muslim women—largely connected to and impacted by 
the Internet—choose to support violent extremism.  
To identify potential motives, this chapter examines three previous extremist 
movements and explains the rationale behind women’s participation in each. It then shifts 
to the current crisis and examines the role of women in the Islamic State. With this 
knowledge, it proposes five feasible explanations for Western women’s movements 
toward ISIL’s ideology. 
A. WOMEN IN EXTREMISM: ROLES 
For millennia, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu men and women have waged 
war and violent terrorist attacks against their adversaries. Aryn Baker, a TIME magazine 
correspondent, declares, “Women have always played a role in war, if not in actual 
combat then in the vital areas of intelligence gathering, medical care, food preparation, 
and support.”104 Likewise, women support violent extremism in numerous ways. 
Furthermore, their reasons for engaging in terrorism remain extremely complex and 
personal.105 In the Journal of International Women’s Studies, Farhana Ali, a terrorism 
specialist and political analyst, wrote, “A woman’s decision to pursue violent action is 
impacted by personal experiences and outcomes.”106 Ali argues that personal reasons—
such as revolution, honor, revenge, and identity—initially trump ideological ones.107  
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Like their motives, women’s roles in terrorist organizations range from suicide 
bombers to ideological educators. In “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Dr. 
Katharina Von Knop, assistant professor at the Department for International Politics at 
the University of the Armed Forces in Munich, Germany, explains that bin Laden viewed 
women as essential supporters, organizers, and promoters of the Islamic jihad. Women 
ensure the survival of the terrorist organization by supporting their male relatives, 
managing the finances, and educating their children on the proper faith.108 Dr. Von Knop 
explains, “In some respects, females are considered to be the most effective and loyal 
supporters of terrorist organizations.”109 Furthermore, women sustain the insurgency “by 
giving birth to many fighters and raising them in a revolutionary environment.”110 
B. WOMEN IN EXTREMISM: MOTIVATIONS 
The Tamil Tigers, Black Widows, and Palestinian bombers are prevalent 
examples of women in extremist movements. These women personally suffered the 
mental and physical scars of war and injustice; thus, their motives were primarily rooted 
in revenge and freedom. While the formal conflict in Sri Lanka has subsided, the tensions 
in Chechnya and Palestine persist to date.  
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organized in 1976 in response to 
ethnic imbalances and favoritism by the majority Sinhalese population toward the 
minority Tamil people. According to Kate Pickert of Time, the Sinhalese population, 
approximately 75 percent of Sri Lanka, speaks Sinhala and practices Buddhism. The 
Tamils, 15 percent of the population, have their own language and practice Hinduism.111 
Therefore, when Sinhala and Buddhism were declared the official language and religion 
of the state, intense resistance and violence toward the Sri Lankan government ensued.112 
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From May 1976 to May 2009, the LTTE fought for an independent state for the Tamil 
people. 
Defending Tamil life was the LTTE’s principal objective.113 Originators of the 
suicide belt, the LTTE executed a series of extremely violent attacks against the 
Sinhalese government.114 They targeted high profile Sri Lankan and Indian officials, 
successfully assassinating two world leaders: Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi of India in 
1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993.115 The central 
government tried to suppress the Tamil insurgency with violent force and systematic 
killing. Tamil businesses and homes were destroyed, and men and women were 
frequently arrested, tortured, raped, and killed.116 The government’s response inspired 
more violence and persuaded Tamil women to join the rebellion.  
The Tamil people live by the Hindu culture that glorifies motherhood and 
traditional gender roles in society.117 Thus, Tamil women were gradually incorporated 
into the insurgency and initially served the LTTE in non-combatant roles such as cooks, 
nurses, and administrators.118 Over time, however, they were integrated into violent 
missions, to include their sacrifice as suicide bombers.119 Martyrdom was celebrated by 
the Tamil people as a purposeful death and valorous act, providing women a way to 
assert their identity, fight repression, and take revenge.120 Although the LTTE was 
officially defeated by the Sri Lankan military in May 2009, subtle violence between the 
two ethnicities persists.121 Like the Tamil Tigers, the Chechen Black Widows suffered 
immense pain under an oppressive government.  
                                                 
113 Cindy D. Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: Women’s Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism,” 
Female Terrorism and Militancy, ed. Cindy D. Ness (New York: Routledge, 2008), 24. 
114 Pickert, “A Brief History.” 
115 Ibid. 
116 Frances Harrison, “Tamils Still Being Raped and Tortured in Sri Lanka,” BBC, November 9, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24849699. 
117 Ness, “Name of the Cause,” 23. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 24. 
121 Harrison, “Tamils Raped and Tortured.” 
 26 
Chechnya, located in the Southern part of Eastern Europe, is a federal republic of 
Russia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Chechen people have 
sought independence from the Russian government. From the onset of the first Chechen 
war in December 1994, the Chechen women have endured dreadful suffering: rape, 
ethnic hatred, sexism, and depression. Paul J. Murphy, a former U.S. intelligence and 
counterterrorism official, asserts that within this perverse and terrifying environment, the 
famous Black Widow bombers were born.122 
The Black Widows are the product of horrific suffering and loss. Often the 
mothers, sisters, or widows of Chechen men slayed in combat with Russian troops, the 
Black Widows are female suicide bombers. Rather infamous, they played a role in two of 
the largest mass hostage events associated with suicide terrorism to date: Moscow’s 
Dubrovka Theater and North Ossentia’s Beslan School.123 They have executed a majority 
of the suicide attacks in Chechnya—roughly 42 percent.124 In addition to their sacrifice 
as bombers, Chechen women assist in a variety of noncombatant roles to include 
intelligence collection, weapons acquisition, funds management, and safe house 
maintenance.125  
The physical and mental wounds of the Chechen wars persist; as a result, the 
motivation for terrorist activity still exists. Dr. Anne Speckhard, associate professor of 
Psychiatry at Georgetown University Medical School, and Dr. Khapta Akhmedova, 
professor of Psychology at Chechen State University, declare, “Psychological trauma, a 
desire for revenge, and the nationalist desire to throw an enemy occupier out of their 
country were the strongest factors motivating them (Chechen women) to seek out terrorist 
organizations that promised a ready and ideologically honorable way to do so.”126 
Similar motivations move Palestinian women to violent extremism. 
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For decades, the Israeli/Palestinian lands have burned with hatred and violence. 
According to Dr. Mia Bloom, the on-going conflict between the Jewish and Arab peoples 
started in the late nineteenth century. A Zionist movement and social unrest in Europe 
encouraged Jewish emigration to the Holy Land. The land, then owned by the Ottoman 
Empire, needed new trade and currency. As a result, the Ottoman Sultan welcomed the 
Jewish immigrants in hopes they would bring prosperity. The Ottoman Empire collapsed 
after World War I and its territories, including the Holy Land, were split between Britain, 
France, and Russia. The British supported Zionist aspirations in Palestine. From 1931–
1936, Jewish immigrants in the Holy Land doubled, and the Palestinians began to revolt 
in opposition. Nevertheless, the Jewish population flourished. After World War II, 
Britain could no longer afford to maintain a presence in the Middle East. Thus, on May 
14, 1948, British troops left the Holy Land, and Israel declared itself an independent 
state. Within 24 hours of the announcement, Israel was attacked by its Arab neighbors.127 
The Middle East remains plagued by turmoil and hatred. The Palestinians 
maintain that Israel stole their land and consequently refuse to acknowledge its 
statehood.128 As such, Palestinian women remain active participants in and recruiters and 
suicide bombers for terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hizbollah.129 According 
to Edna Erez, professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and 
Anat Berko, researcher at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
women’s paths to terrorism vary. For some, terrorism is a way to seek revenge for the 
loss of a relative or friend.130 For others, it is a way to assert female identity and rebel 
against a patriarchal society.131 Likewise, Erez and Berko explain that terrorism is often 
“a license for experiencing excitement and thrill that Palestinian women are normally 
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barred from having.”132 Moreover, participation instills feelings of independence, pride, 
purpose and uniqueness in women.133  
Palestinian women are not the only females supporting terrorism in the region, 
though. Recent reports estimate that as many as 3,000 Western migrants have joined the 
Islamic State, with approximately 550 being women.134 While motivations for migration 
vary, women’s roles within the Islamic State are clearly defined.  
C. ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The main role of the muhajirah [female migrant] here is to support her 




Women’s roles in the Islamic State are instrumental and established on religious 
duty to family.136 The Quilliam Foundation, a counter-terrorism think-tank in England, 
translated the document, “Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study,” 
written by the Islamic State’s all-female brigade, al-Khanssaa. Directed toward females 
in neighboring Gulf countries, the document details the role of women in the Islamic 
State, stressing no greater responsibilities than those of a wife and mother.137 Al-
Khanssaa writes, “This is women’s fundamental role and rightful place. It is the 
harmonious way for her to live and interact amidst her sons and her people, to bring up 
and educate, protect and care for the next generation to come.”138 
As such, women primarily serve IS in domestic roles. According to Carolyn 
Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
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“They [women] support male fighters in a non-military capacity.”139 Secondary roles 
include jihadists (by appointment), teachers, nurses, and doctors.140 Regardless of their 
duty, women are expected to remain mostly hidden from society and veiled141 -- a stark 
difference from the expectations of Western society.  
D. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR MIGRATION 
Despite the familial separation and professional, educational, and social 
constraints, Western women continue to migrate to the Middle East. Why? The authors of 
“‘Til Martyrdom Do Us Part,’” a report published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
in May 2015, declare, “Ultimately, these women believe that joining ISIL in Syria will 
secure their place in paradise, give them opportunity to take part in the construction of a 
utopian society, while also providing those sensations of adventure, belonging, and 
sisterhood.”142 
In reality, Western Muslim women’s motivations for migration are complex and 
multi-layered. Some motives originate with objections to Western society’s 
discrimination of Muslim citizens and progress toward the ideological desire for a 
Caliphate. Other factors include relationships, which fulfil the psychological need to 
belong, and identity assertion, which empowers women in a patriarchal society. A final 
influence is ISIL’s sophisticated recruitment campaign, which skillfully targets 
individuals. 
Potential motives and their relevance are discussed in the following section. These 
motivations, however, are not black and white—rather multiple shades of gray. Such 
motives—isolation in the West, family, religious duty—are publicized via ISIL 
recruitment propaganda to incite the passion and determination to migrate to the Middle 
East. 
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1. Grievances toward Western Society 
Post-World War II guest-worker programs introduced scores of Muslim 
immigrants to Western Europe.143 Though intended to be temporary inhabitants, many 
Muslims stayed in Western Europe and started families and careers there.144 Despite their 
numerous contributions to post-war reconstruction, many Muslims withstood, and 
continue to endure, discrimination and prejudice from native Western Europeans. As a 
result, many young European Muslims today feel culturally and socially isolated.145  
In Breeding Bin Ladens, Dr. Zachary Shore, a historian of international conflict 
and professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, argues that isolation from European 
society makes Muslims more vulnerable to violent extremism. He explains that young 
European Muslims often perceive Europe and America as spiritually empty.146 
Moreover, they are torn between two identities. The first is European – contemporary and 
worldly. The other is “pan-Islamist: a global community, united under God.”147 
Moreover, Dr. Shore notes, “Islam is providing a powerful magnet to those youth, who 
crave greater meaning in their lives. They are finding in Islam a sense of fulfillment that 
they have not found in mainstream European culture.”148 
Today, Muslim immigrants constitute the migrant majority in most Western 
European states.149 In January 2015, Conrad Hackett from the Pew Research Center 
reported that Germany and France have the largest Muslim populations in the European 
Union. French Muslims make up 7.5 percent of the country’s population, British Muslims 
4.8 percent, and the numbers continue to rise.150 Europe’s Muslim population has 
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steadily grown by 1 percent each decade since 1990—a trend expected to continue 
through 2030.151 Moreover, the median age of Europe’s Muslim population (32 years) is 
eight years younger than native Europeans (40 years).152 
Despite seventy years of habitation and a growing population, many European 
Muslims still fail to integrate into mainstream society.153 In an attempt to resolve such 
issues, Western European governments have adopted multicultural policies to protect, 
promote, and incorporate minority cultures and religions—versus forced racial 
assimilation. According to Irene Bloemraad, associate professor of Sociology and the 
Thomas Garden Barnes Chair of Canadian Studies at the University of California, 
Berkeley, “If minority integration is facilitated, greater civic and political cohesion might 
follow and prevent the negative consequences that can flow from marginalization and 
feelings of exclusion among minority residents.”154  
The efficiency of multiculturalism is a contemporary political debate in Western 
Europe.155 The discussion focuses on whether or not multicultural policies, laws, and 
regulations—intended to close inequality gaps—are effective integration tools.156 In 
October 2010, German chancellor Angela Merkel stated that multiculturalism had 
“utterly failed” in Germany.157 Likewise, in early 2011, other Western European leaders 
shared similar sentiments. French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 
multiculturalism was ineffective, and British prime minister David Cameron criticized it 
for “failing to promote a sense of common identity and encouraging Muslim segregation 
and radicalization.”158 
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Proponents of multiculturalism believe that recognizing and accommodating 
minority cultures increases migrants’ attachment and engagement in society.159 Such 
policies preserve culture and remedy the economic and political disadvantages that 
minorities suffer. Critics argue that multicultural states “seem tolerant by showering 
minorities with rights while segregating them from, rather than absorbing them into, the 
rest of society.”160 Opponents argue that multiculturalism has become “a proxy for other 
social and political issues: immigration, identity, political disenchantment, working-class 
decline.”161 Moreover, an unnecessary emphasis on diversity simply accentuates 
differences and undermines the collective identity. Finally, critics declare that 
multiculturalism encourages minorities to live “parallel lives” in isolated communities, 
which hinders economic integration and weakens social ties and social capital.162  
Effective or not, most Western European states have embraced multiculturalism. 
Researchers at Queen’s University in Ontario developed a multiculturalism policy index 
that measured eight public policies and their presence in Western states from 1980 to 
2010.163 The study inspected 21 countries for the following:  
An official affirmation of multiculturalism; multiculturalism in the school 
curriculum; inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media 
and licensing; exemptions from dress codes in public laws; acceptance of 
dual citizenship; funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural 
activities; funding of bilingual and mother-tongue instruction; and 
affirmative action for immigrant groups.164  
In most countries, there was an increase in the number of multicultural policies 
from 1980 to 2010.165 Of the eight policies, Britain moderately increased from 2.5 in 
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1980 to 5.5 in 2010. France, a historical critic of multiculturalism, increased from 1 to 
2.166 
The British government embraces multiculturalism, but many citizens do not. As 
a result, the UK has witnessed an increase in Islamophobia among native and extremism 
among Muslim immigrants.167 France proudly rejects multiculturalism and instead 
promotes secularism, the strict separation of the state from religious institutions. The 
French proclaim that every citizen is treated as a citizen rather than a member of a 
specific racial, cultural, or ethnic group.168 Secularism—or assimilation—however, has 
not integrated Muslims in France any better than multiculturalism in Britain. According 
to Carla Power at TIME magazine, “France’s cherished codes of secularism clash with 
the public nature of the practice of Islam, a faith that in Muslim-majority countries is 
stamped on public life, from politics to laws to the wearing of beards and veils, or 
breaking for prayers in the middle of the work-day.”169 Moreover, French secularism has 
ignored the rampant racism and prejudice in the country,170 resulting in workplace 
discrimination, police profiling, and political scapegoating.171  
In many ways, multiculturalism and secularism have fractured European society. 
European countries have “enacted either multicultural policies that place communities in 
constricting boxes or assimilationist ones that distance minorities from the 
mainstream.”172 Despite the debatable successes or failures of integration, the authors of 
“Becoming Mulan” argue that Western women that support ISIL are not primarily 
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motivated by their grievances with Western society. Instead, many simply desire an 
ideologically pure state that lives and abides by Islamic law.173  
2. Ideology 
The appeal of ISIL’s ideology, a sect of Jihadi-Salafism, is growing among 
Western European Muslims. According to Marc Sageman, many Muslims are morally 
disgusted by the West.174 Moreover, they believe that democracy is a sham and only 
Islamic societies are truly just.175 They profess that “Islam is the path to peace;”176 thus, 
it is their religious duty to defend it from apostates and external attacks.177 These 
feelings—validated and encouraged by Jihadi-Salafism—motivate radical behavior.178 
Salafism is a distinct movement within Sunni Islam that is deeply rooted in “pre-
modern theological tradition.”179 Salafi Muslims perceive themselves as the only “true” 
Muslims and seek to purify Islam by eliminating idolatry and affirming God’s 
“Oneness.”180 Although Al Qaeda and ISIL both practice Salafism, “the Islamic State 
does so with greater severity … it is absolutely uncompromising on doctrinal matters, 
prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of Salafi thought.”181 ISIL’s extremely 
violent version of Salafism is attributed to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the deceased founder 
of Al Qaeda in Iraq.182 
Salafist ideology is preached, exercised, and enforced in the Caliphate. In “From 
Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” Cole Bunzel, a Ph.D. 
candidate at Princeton University, translates ISIL’s “Creed and Path,” which outlines the 
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organization’s core beliefs. Fundamental principles include the necessity to destroy all 
forms of idolatry, such as democracy, and to kill apostates and unbelievers.183 The creed 
declares, “Secularism in the multiplicity of its banners and the variety of its programs, 
such as nationalism, patriotism, Communism, and Ba’thism, is flagrant unbelief, 
nullifying Islam and expelling one from the religion.”184 Furthermore, Christians and 
Jews within IS territory are “people of war” and do not warrant a protection status.185  
Bunzel reports that ISIL summons all jihadi groups to consolidate under one 
banner. It believes in worshipping the Prophet and upholding God’s Sharia law. It 
demands that women remain chaste and pure, veil their faces, and refrain from 
socializing with men. Moreover, ISIL declares that Islamic jihad is an individual 
obligation and its rejection is a great sin. In return for jihadists’ sacrifices, ISIL pledges to 
care for the families of martyrs and prisoners of war.186 
Western female migrants must fully embrace Salafism in the Caliphate.187 
Although many outsiders perceive the Caliphate as an extremely oppressive and violent 
entity, many Muslim women recognize it as a positive and powerful existence.188 The 
Islamic State promises the holy rewards of the afterlife, since a whole-hearted 
commitment to religious duty secures one’s place in heaven.189 As such, ISIL’s state-
building mission is a particularly strong motivation for Western women to migrate.190  
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3. Relationships/Sense of Belonging 
A strong obligation to family and desire for marriage, friendship, and a sense of 
belonging frequently attract women to violent extremism.191 The needs for relationships 
and a sense of belonging are heavily researched by psychologists. In the 1940s, Abraham 
Maslow, an American Psychologist and professor, studied human survival needs and 
people’s motivation to acquire them.192 The most basic human needs, or first level, are 
physiological: water, food, shelter, and sleep.193 Physiological needs are followed by 
safety: family, employment, and health.194 The third level, interestingly, is “love and 
belonging.”195 Belonging needs cannot be fulfilled until one’s physiological and safety 
needs are met.196 Belonging, however, takes precedence over the fourth and fifth levels: 
self-esteem and self-actualization.197 
In 1995, Dr. Roy F. Baumeister, a professor of Psychology at Florida State 
University, and Dr. Mark R. Leary, a professor of Psychology at Duke University, 
published “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental 
Human Motivation.” In it, the authors defend the “belongingness hypothesis,” which 
states that human connection is a basic psychological necessity.198 The article asserts, “A 
need to belong, that is, a need to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of 
interpersonal relationships, is innately prepared among human beings.”199 The authors’ 
empirical research highlights two key features.200 First, humans need frequent personal 
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interactions, preferably positive and peaceful, with other people.201 Second, the 
perception of a relationship fulfills the need to belong.202 Therefore, to achieve a sense of 
belonging, “People need to perceive that there is an interpersonal bond or relationship 
marked by stability, affective concern, and continuation into the foreseeable future.”203 
Promised relations—through marriage, family, and sisterhoods—are the backbone 
of ISIL’s recruitment campaign targeted toward women. Research from the Institute of 
Strategic Dialogue reveals, “For any young individuals coming to terms with adulthood, 
there is an important developmental period of identity building; of defining oneself 
within wider society.”204 As such, young Western Muslim women, often dissatisfied with 
Western society, are captivated by the Islamic State’s romanticized stories of Muslim 
sisterhoods and weddings with jihadi warriors in the Caliphate. Female migrants 
consistently discuss the camaraderie, community, and sisterhood they experience via 
social media platforms.205 Muslim sisterhoods offer companionship, comfort, social 
activity, and study groups that discuss the proper way to educate children in the faith.206 
Dr. Von Knop writes, “Members of the sisterhood are usually recruited by other females, 
especially relatives.”207 She adds, “This special relationship goes much deeper than that 
to the level of the heart from which the bonds of Sisterhood emanate.”208 In addition to 
friends and community, family plays a role in women’s decisions to migrate. In Islam, 
arranged marriage is a powerful tradition that often unites men and women for social, 
religious, or political reasons.209 
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4. Assert Female Identity 
Women from patriarchal societies, like the Chechen Black Widows, challenge 
gender rules and norms and hope that their militant acts will transform their social 
status.210 In “Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the World: The Role of Muslim Female 
Fighters,” Farhana Ali declares, “Many women are determined to raise the gender 
equality issue.”211 Every role, whether bomber, organizer, or facilitator, gives women a 
sense of power and freedom. Terrorist activity occurs in the public realm—a world 
prohibited to many women. As a result, “Female terrorists are thus able to pursue 
opportunities other than the limited ones available in traditional societies. . . As agents of 
violence, women are no longer defined according to their gendered roles.”212  
There is debate, however, as to whether women’s participation in extremist 
movements actually advances their social status or promotes gender equality. Ali asserts, 
“No conflict today has elevated the status of the Muslim woman, nor attempted to 
address the societal and religious norms that solidify the role of the Muslim woman.”213 
Like-minded scholars argue that women’s roles in terrorist organizations are limited to 
what men deem appropriate and can oversee/control.214  
According to Marc Sageman, the next generation of terrorists “are young people 
seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging in their lives.”215 Women are 
increasingly part of this generation. ISIL propaganda plays heavily on women’s romantic 
ideas of adventure.216 It highlights the notion “that supporting a jihadist husband and 
taking on the ISIS ideology is an empowering role for females.”217 In addition, some 
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scholars argue that women are fascinated by ISIL and may feel more respected and 
significant in ISIL territory than in the West.218 
5. Targeted Recruitment 
As previously addressed, ISIL operates a sophisticated propaganda and 
recruitment campaign. It actively pursues Western women through social media and 
personal connections. As illustrated below, it tailors its recruitment tactics to specific 
individuals. It is possible, then, that a strong motive for migration is the act of being 
single-handedly recruited. 
The article, “ISIS and the Lonely American,” published by New York Times on 
June 27, 2015, illustrates how ISIL actively recruits Western citizens via social media. 
The article follows “Alex,” a 23-year-old Sunday school teacher and nanny from rural 
Washington State.
219
 Her mother battled drug addiction and lost custody of her daughter 
when she was 11 months old.
220
 Alex suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, which 
according to a therapist, “Contributed to a persistent lack of maturity and poor 
judgment.”221 Since infancy, Alex had lived with her grandparents; yet, she always felt 
lost and alone.
222
 She dropped out of college and struggled to retain employment for 
various reasons.
223
 Her life, according to New York Times author, Rukmini Callimachi, 
“Mostly seemed like a blurred series of babysitting shifts and lonely weekends roaming 
the mall.”224 In a quest for identify and friendship, Alex discovered Islam via the Internet. 
Online, Alex developed friendships with several Muslims who guided her through 
the fundamentals of Islam. She joined multiple online chat groups and engaged in hours 
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of conversation regarding Islam on Twitter, Skype, and email. Finally, she felt the 
necessary connection she always desired. Her Muslim friends were constantly online for 
her—willing to spend hours answering questions about Islam and providing 
companionship. Unaware to Alex, her new friends were Islamic extremist recruiters, 
professionally trained to radicalize Western men and women. Recruiters are taught to 
spend time with potential recruits, to listen to them carefully, and to share in their joys 
and sadness. They are taught to gradually introduce the basic fundamentals of Islam and 
to avoid the topic of jihad. Moreover, recruiters are well-versed in Christianity. They 
understand the Bible and how to challenge its messages. For example, they use John 
12:44, “And Jesus Christ cried out and said, ‘Whoever believes in me, believes not in me, 
but in He who sent me,’” to stress that Jesus was a prophet but not God. Allah is God.225 
Alex was wholly committed to her new online community. She met Muslim men 
who were willing to engage in conversation and support her conversion from Christianity 
to Islam. She started to receive gifts from friends: a $200 gift card to 
Islamicbookstore.com, prayer rugs, colored hijabs, chocolates, and money for dinners. 
Finally, when she was comfortable, Alex declared her faith, the Shahada, on Twitter and 
instantly acquired new Muslim “brothers” and “sisters.”226 
Through it all, recruiters encouraged Alex to keep her conversion to Islam a secret 
from her Christian family. One man, Faisal, encouraged her to only communicate with 
Muslims online because Muslims were persecuted in the United States; as such, she could 
be branded a terrorist.
227
 Alex successfully kept the secret from her family. At first, this 
was not an issue. As the lie deepened, however, she again felt isolated—this time from 
her family and the ones she loved.
228
 According to Mr. Mubin Shaikh, a former radical 
Muslim and recruiter for an extremist organization, Alex’s story is quite common. Mr. 






Shaikh states, “We [recruiters] look for people who are isolated and if they are not 
isolated already, then we isolated them.”229 
Alex’s grandparents eventually discovered her secret life online and immediately 
intervened.
230
 The friendships and bonds Alex created, however, were quite strong. To 
date, she still communicates with an old “friend” on Skype.231 Callimachi, observes, 
“Even though the Islamic State’s ideology is explicitly at odds with the West, the group is 
making a relentless effort to recruit Westerners into its ranks, eager to exploit them for 
their outsize propaganda value.”232 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined five potential reasons for European Muslim women’s 
migrations to ISIL territory: grievances toward Western society, ideology, 
relationships/belonging, identity, and targeted recruitment. It demonstrated that women’s 
motives to participate in violence are varied and complex. Moreover, it highlighted a 
significant difference between the European women that support ISIL and the women 
involved in past extremist movements. The Black Widows and Tamil Tigers, for 
example, lived in war-torn regions. They personally suffered the physical and mental 
wounds of violence and injustice, spawning their desires for revenge, righteousness, and 
freedom.  
As discussed in the next chapter, many of the West’s female migrants come from 
moderate Muslim or Christian families. They are not exposed to routine violence or 
recurring personal loss. ISIL is thousands of miles away; however, the Internet brings the 
wars in Iraq and Syria to France and Britain. ISIL’s online propaganda radicalizes young 
Western women and generates feelings of hate and vengeance. For these reasons, the 
organization’s recruitment campaign is invaluable to its survival.  
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IV. WHO ARE THE WESTERN MIGRANTS AND WHAT ARE 
THEY SAYING? 
This chapter introduces a sample of 11 female European migrants—eight from 
Britain and three from France—who traveled to ISIL territory. These women were 
deliberately selected because they journeyed without a male companion, eliminating any 
patriarchal influence. Their backgrounds, presented below, were analyzed for common 
themes or obvious motives for migration. Since family, culture, education, and social life 
could encourage radicalization, the following questions were considered: Are there any 
known incidents of Western discrimination? Were the women outcasts or misfits in 
society? Were they exposed to extremist beliefs at their schools or mosques? Did local 
family or friends introduce them to ISIL ideology?  
Unfortunately, these women’s motives were not easy to identify; moreover, it was 
difficult to determine definitive trends due to the limited sample size and gaps in personal 
information. As such, the second part of this chapter reviews social media conversations 
and messages from a broader pool of European female migrants. Social media 
interactions expose women’s true values and beliefs, feasibly suggesting why they chose 
to migrate. Ultimately, analysis of both the backgrounds and social media accounts 
revealed a few common patterns, beliefs, and vulnerabilities that are worth noting—
particularly because many are echoed in ISIL’s propaganda and narratives. 
A. CASE STUDIES 
Selection of case studies was reliant on adequate information from secondary 
sources—family testimonies, interviews, and articles. Since ISIL and Islamic extremism 
are sensitive topics in the West, many migrants’ families and friends have avoided the 
media and withheld private details about the girls’ lives. Thus, it was difficult to find a 
sample size that could pinpoint conclusive trends or behaviors. Despite the restrictions, 
11 women were selected; moreover, background analysis revealed six common 
characteristics among them. First, all 11 migrants were—and still are—active on social 
media. On this note, ISIL uses Western female recruits’ social media accounts to lure 
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other women to the Caliphate. Second, 9 of the 11 migrants were young, between 15 and 
24 years old, and possibly attracted to the romantic images of marriage and humanitarian 
service in the state. Next, research confirmed that 8 of the 11 came from moderate 
religious families, indicating their radicalization originated with outside sources—not 
relatives. Furthermore, ISIL’s propaganda and social media campaigns most likely 
exacerbated and expedited radicalization. Fourth, 10 migrants performed well in school 
or had already achieved a professional career. Fifth, 7 of the 11 were liked by their 
classmates and peers. Finally, all migrants’ families were shocked and appalled by their 
disappearances and decisions to support violent Islamic extremism. Unfortunately, 
several families are still unaware of their daughters’ exact whereabouts or circumstances. 
1. The Halane Twins 
On July 9, 2014, the sixteen-year-old Halane twins, Zahra and Salma, entered 
Syria from the Turkish border. Born of Somali descent, the girls, from Chorlton, Greater 
Manchester, were described by friends and neighbors as well-adjusted, liked, and 
intelligent—both aspiring to work in the medical field. A few factors suggest the girls’ 
conservative upbringing and religious beliefs were stricter than other migrants. For 
example, the girls’ father ran an intensive Quranic studies program and was known to 
unashamedly recite scripture. In addition, unlike other female migrants, the Halane sisters 
were exposed to ISIL ideology and extremist beliefs by their older brother, Ahmed 
Ibrahim Mohammed Halane, who migrated to the Middle East in 2013. Despite these 
influences, the girls’ friends say religion was rarely mentioned in their relationships.233 
The Halane family was devastated by the girls’ departure to ISIL territory. On 
November 2, 2014, the Daily Mail reported the twins’ parents, Ibrahim and Khadra, 
traveled to Syria in July 2014 to rescue their daughters. Unfortunately, Khadra was 
detained by IS fighters and not freed until September 2014. Ibrahim worked through a 
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charity to communicate with Zahra. Both girls, however, refused to leave and insisted 
their lives were in the Caliphate.
234
 
Since migrating to ISIL territory, the twins have maintained a very active online 
presence, primarily via Twitter and Instagram.
235
 They have demonstrated a high 
proficiency in social media and have overcome online censorship mechanisms by 
“alternating usernames, changing Twitter handles and using ‘shout-out’ tactics to regain 
their follower networks quickly and efficiently.”236 Both girls capitalized on the media 
attention surrounding their disappearance and continue to encourage other Western 
women to make the hijra.
237
  
Studying their behavior on social media, scholars conclude that the twins have 
become more extreme since joining ISIL and losing their husbands to martyrdom.
238
 Both 
girls support and glorify violence against disbelievers, accept martyrdom with great 
pride, encourage immediate marriage for migrants, and attempt to induce feelings of guilt 
and failure in Western women not supporting the Caliphate.
239
 Of interest, the girls, 
particularly Zahra, display a strong sense of “ummah consciousness.”240 The ummah 
refers to the global community of Muslims and generates a sense of belonging and unity. 
The term transcends identity boundaries and creates a meta-identity, such as the 
Caliphate.
241
 It reinforces the “us” versus “them” mentality, with the ummah (Caliphate) 
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against the kuffar (others).
242
 By setting the two groups—Muslim and non-Muslim—as 
rivals, Zahra dehumanizes and justifies violence against the “other.”243 
There are two prominent factors in the Halane sisters’ case. First, the girls were 
raised in a strict, Muslim home. Conservative religious standards were engrained in their 
lives. Moreover, their brother migrated to ISIL territory in 2013, perhaps signaling that it 
was an appropriate path for Muslims. Second, the girls are now extremely vocal 
recruiters online, which raise questions of whether they were heavily recruited and are 
now mirroring the process they underwent. Together, ideology and recruitment appear to 
be the strongest factors that pulled the girls to ISIL territory. 
2. Amira Abase, Shamima Begum, and Khadiza Sultana 
Amira, Shamima, and Khadiza migrated from the UK to ISIL territory on 
February 17, 2015. The three friends were hardworking students from Bethnal Green 
Academy School in Tower Hamlets. Little background information is available on 
Shamima Begum and Khadiza Sultana; however, Amira’s disappearance attracted media 
attention when news surfaced that her father had attended an Islamic extremist rally in 
2012. Extremist ideology was not a prevalent or noticeable part of her life, though. Amira 
was fifteen years old when she migrated, and classmates described her as a normal 
teenage girl: active on social media, frustrated with school exams, and infatuated with 
Western clothing brands. She was a Chelsea football fan, a high academic achiever, and 
an accomplished public speaker.
244
  
In January 2015, Amira and Shamima started sharing their opinions of the Syrian 
conflict with friends online. Amira expressed sorrow and anger when tweeting images of 
Syrian children living in war-torn conditions.
245
 Shamima voiced a desire to help 
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 Six days before leaving the UK, Amira asked for prayers and 
tweeted, “Really need it. Pray Allah grants me the highest ranks in Jannah.”247 Days later, 
Amira, Shamima, and Khadiza began their journeys to Syria. 
The girls’ families begged for their return. In a public statement, Shamima’s 
family said, “We miss you terribly and are extremely worried about you. Please, if you 
hear this message, get in touch and let us know you are safe. We want you home with us. 
You belong at home with us.”248 Khadiza’s family expressed concern for her safety and 
declared, “We, together, sincerely pray and hope this message reaches you. We pray that 
no harm comes to you, and you are all safe and in good health. In your absence, we, as a 
family, are feeling completely distressed and cannot make sense of why you left 
home.”249 Finally, Amira’s family begged, “Please come home Amira, everyone is 
missing you. You are strong, smart, beautiful and we are hoping you will make the right 
decision. We miss you more that you can imagine. We are worried and we want you to 
think about what you have left behind.”250 Such compassionate appeals suggest the girls 
had strong support networks at home. 
Like the Halane sisters, Amira, Shamima, and Khadiza were young, teenage girls. 
Their motives for migration seem quite different, though. These girls were popular and 
appeared to blend into Western society. They had close friends and families, which seems 
to eliminate the need for belonging or relationships. Instead, they were drawn to ISIL’s 
online propaganda and touched by the immense suffering in war-torn Iraq and Syria. Life 
in the Caliphate was an opportunity to help Muslims around the world. It was an 
adventure and a chance to assert their identities in a new Islamic state.  
                                                 
246 Ashley Fantz and Atika Shubert, “From Scottish Teen to ISIS Bride and Recruiter: The Aqsa 
Mahmood Story,” CNN (CNN, February 24, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/23/world/scottish-teen-
isis-recruiter/. 
247 Saltman and Smith, “Til Martyrdom,” 47. 
248 Harley, “Family of Third Missing Schoolgirl Plead With Her to Come Home,” Telegraph, 






Known only by her username, Shams runs a fascinating blog about her life with 
ISIL, praising the good aspects and prudently addressing the less desirable ones. 
Authorities suspect that she is of Indian and Pakistani descent but lived in the UK for an 
extended period of time.251 Unlike many of the younger migrants, Shams is a physician 
and has operated a women’s clinic in Syria since February 2014.252 Her role as a 
physician, however, is secondary. As a wife and mother, “Sham extols her role . . . as 
principally important responsibilities for both personal development and the development 
of the state.”253  
Shams’ blog is more moderate than others, indicating that she is more engaged in 
religion than politics.254 She openly professes an unconditional love for her husband and 
struggles with the thought of losing him in war.255 She frequently reflects on the reality 
of life as a mujahid’s wife. She writes, “I know the fact that one day—my husband will 
be a Shaheed and I have to prepare for it. I can’t ask Allah to grant my husband a long 
life—for death is pre-destined. All I’m asking Him is a strong heart and mind.”256 She 
praises ISIL for raising her status as a woman and for providing exceptional public 
services, such as healthcare, in Syria.257 She also admits, however, that conditions are not 
ideal and encourages migrants to have patience, to manage their expectations, and to 
prepare for hardship.258  
Shams seems to be motivated by ideology versus adventure, political grievances, 
identity, or relationships. As such, she does not try to recruit every Muslim woman to 
ISIL territory—only those completely devoted to Islam. In fact, she believes many 
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Western Muslim women are naïve and not physically or mentally prepared for life in the 
Islamic state.259 She encourages migration only for the sake of Allah and warns, “Don’t 
make marrying a mujahid as your priority.”260 She does not romanticize or glamourize 
life in the Caliphate. Shams’ realistic tone undoubtedly discourages some women; 
however, it challenges and encourages others. Thus, her blog remains a popular and 
dangerous recruitment tool.  
4. Aqsa Mahmoud 
Aqsa Mahmoud was raised in an affluent neighborhood in Glasgow. In the 1970s, 
her father, a moderate Muslim, became the first Pakistani cricket player in Scotland. His 
success provided Aqsa and her three siblings a comfortable life, with all four children 
attending a prestigious private school.261 Aqsa had a normal upbringing. She was a fan of 
pop culture: Coldplay, Harry Potter, and The Hunger Games.262 She was 19 years old 
and attending university when she migrated to ISIL territory in November 2013.263  
When Aqsa went to college, her family noticed small changes in her behavior, 
such as abandoning her loves of music and fiction. Her parents knew she studied and 
prayed the Quran; however, they were not alarmed because she never expressed extremist 
beliefs and remained close to the family.264 Her family was appalled by her 
disappearance, begged her to return, and stated, “You are a disgrace to your family and 
the people of Scotland. Your actions are a perverted and evil distortion of Islam.”265  
It is difficult to pinpoint Aqsa’s potential reasons for migration. She seems to 
come from a strong family that put her on the path to a successful future. Her family 
believes her radicalization occurred online,266 where she was also potentially targeted and 
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recruited. She now maintains a strong social media following on Tumblr. Her messages 
support and encourage Muslim women to leave their families in the West to build new 
families with ISIL.267 She posts pictures of guns and encourages attacks on the West.268 
She proclaims, “If you cannot make it to the battlefield, then bring the battlefield to 
yourself.”269 Aqsa praises ISIL for providing for its people and inspires believers to focus 
on the heavenly rewards of the afterlife.270 While her parents continue to plead for her 
return, Aqsa remains committed to her life in the Islamic State. In a Tumblr post, she 
quotes Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim scholar and militant for al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula. She writes, “Change, always in history, depends on the youth.”271 
5. Khadijah Dare 
Grace Dare, now known as Khadijah Dare, was born in Nigeria but emigrated to 
Lewisham, South London as a child. Like other ISIL migrants, Dare had a typical 
upbringing. According to her mother, Victoria, she was raised a devout Christian, and 
friends described her as popular, loveable, and sweet.272 Dare had normal pastimes: 
watching football, ordering Chinese food, and enjoying her mother’s home cooking. Prior 
to migration, she studied media, film, and social sciences at a local college.273 
Now twenty-two years old, Dare converted to Islam approximately four years ago 
at college. She worshiped at the Lewisham Islamic Center, an institution that insists it 
does not breed terrorists despite its links to the killers of British Soldier, Lee Rigby, and 
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the radical cleric, Abu Hamza.274 Sources believe Dare was radicalized online.275 As a 
British Muslim, Dare was a victim of overt Western prejudice—the only case of known 
discrimination in this thesis. When she started to wear the full face veil, locals told her to 
“go back to her country,” to which she would reply, “I was born round the corner.”276 
Dare moved to Syria in 2012 and married the now deceased Swedish fighter, Abu Bakr, 
with whom she had two sons.277  
Her candid online presence has made her a celebrity among ISIL supporters. She 
appeared in an ISIL recruitment video that called on British Muslims to join the jihad. 
Alongside images of slaughtered Muslim children, Dare declared, “These are your 
brothers and sisters as well and they need our help, so instead of sitting down and 
focusing on your families or focusing on your studies, you need to stop being selfish 
because time is ticking.”278 When James Foley, an American journalist, was beheaded in 
August 2014, Dare reveled on social media and boasted that “she would be the first 
British woman to kill a U.S. Soldier.”279 Dare defends life in the Islamic State and 
declares, “I’m not oppressed. If I was oppressed, I wouldn’t be a Muslim right now.”280 
Despite her mother’s requests, Dare refuses to return to the UK. 
Like Aqsa, college was an important time in Khadijah Dare’s life because of her 
conversion to Islam. Unfortunately, Western discrimination and prejudice soon followed. 
A likely consequence of that discrimination has been Khadijah’s violent tone toward the 
West. She has been extremely vocal on social media, praising beheadings and gloating 
that she would someday conduct violence. Thus, it appears Khadijah’s migration was 
primarily motivated by ISIL’s ideology, her grievances with the West, and the unique 
opportunity to assert female identity and emerge as a heroine.  









6. Hayat Boumeddiene 
Twenty-six year old Hayat Boumeddiene is infamously known for her husband, 
Amedy Coulibaly, and his acts of terrorism. On January 9, 2015, two days after the attack 
on Charlie Hebdo, Coulibaly shot and killed a Paris policewoman; immediately after, he 
took hostages and killed four Jewish men at a kosher supermarket before being killed in a 
police shoot-out in Porte de Vincenne, France. Five days prior to Coulibaly’s stint, 
Boumeddiene flew to Istanbul, Turkey. Investigators believe she crossed into Syria on 
January 8, 2015, the day before her husband’s attack.281 Nevertheless, officials suspect 
she helped plan the event.282 Hayat’s father, Mohamed Boumeddiene, was “shocked and 
heartbroken” to hear of his daughter’s involvement.283 
The second issue of Dar al Islam, an ISIL magazine in French, claimed—without 
proof—that Boumeddiene had safely reached the Islamic State.284 The issue, entitled 
“May Allah Curse France,” displayed pictures of the Paris attacks, encouraged future 
attacks, and praised Coulibaly. Moreover, it printed a two-page interview with 
Boumeddiene, in which she allegedly stated, “Praise be to Allah who made the road easy. 
I had no difficulty getting here. … I am relieved to have fulfilled this obligation.”285  
Little is known about Boumeddiene’s childhood. She was born into a large 
French-Algerian family and was placed in foster care after her mother’s death in 1994.286 
In 2010, Boumeddiene told police, “I was placed in care [foster] at the age of 12, because 
I did not accept the speed with which my father remarried after the death of my mother. I 
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changed care [givers] numerous times because I was beaten often.”287 Boumeddiene met 
her husband, Coulibaly, through mutual friends while studying Islam;288 they married in 
2009 in a religious ceremony not recognized by French law.289 French and American 
forces continue to hunt for Boumeddiene in ISIL territory.290 
There are many details missing from Hayat’s story; however, it reasonably 
appears she embraced Islamic extremism in search of meaningful relationships and 
belonging. As a child, she was moved between multiple families—a victim of abuse and 
displacement. As such, she conceivably longed for positive attention, stability, and love. 
When she converted to Islam, she found Coulibaly and other friends who embraced her. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that after losing her husband, she fled to a place where she 
believed she would be accepted, revered, and cared for—the Islamic State. 
7. Sahra Mehenni 
Sahra Mehenni was raised in a middle-class home in Lezignan-Corbieres, a wine 
town in Southern France. Her mother is a French-born Catholic, and her father is an 
Algerian-born Muslim who works at a local wine factory. In early 2014, 17-year-old 
Sahra attracted negative attention from family members when she insisted on wearing the 
full Islamic veil—a violation of French law. Concerned, Sahra’s parents carefully 
watched her behavior and temporarily hid her passport in fear she would migrate. Shortly 
after, Sahra switched schools, and her parents immediately recognized positive changes 
in her behavior. They never heard Sahra talk about Syria or jihad; thus, her sudden 
disappearance was a devastating surprise.291  
Officials believe Sahra, now 18 years old, traveled alone to Turkey, and 
ultimately Syria, in March 2014. On March 11, Kamel Ali Mehenni took his daughter to 
the local train station for school and never saw her again. Since joining ISIL, Sahra’s 
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communication with family has diminished. Within days of her migration, Sahra called 
her older brother and explained that she had just met and married a 25-year-old Tunisian 
man. She explained that her daily life was normal: cooking, cleaning, and taking care of 
children. According to her family, Sahra’s communication feels hollow—like she’s 
forced to recite a script. She continues to post messages on Facebook—often videos 
about jihad and Islam. Sahra told her brother that she has no intention of coming home; 
however, she wants her mother to accept her religion and her marriage. Sahra’s exact 
whereabouts and condition remain a mystery to family and friends.292 
Like Hayat, there are many details missing from Sahra’s story. On the surface, 
though, it appears she was searching for identity, purpose, and possibly belonging. Her 
behavior prior to migration resembled a teenage rebellion against Western conformity—
particularly her family’s rules and French law. It is not known why—at 17 years old—
she switched schools. Was she struggling academically or socially? While Sahra has 
established a life in the Caliphate, she still seeks her mother’s approval, which implies 
that she still considers her Western family a part of her identity. Thus, she may be willing 
to someday return. 
8. Nora El-Bahty 
The third of six children, Nora El-Bahty is the daughter of Moroccan immigrants 
residing in Avignon, France. The El-Bahty family practices Islam; however, it does not 
consider itself strictly religious. As such, Nora carefully hid the signs of radicalization 
from her family. Following her disappearance on January 23, 2014, family members 
discovered a second cell phone number and Facebook account used by recruiters. 
Investigators later determined that Nora, only 15 years old at the time, had flown from 
Paris to Istanbul to Syria.293  
Upon arrival to ISIL territory, Nora immediately contacted her family. Like the 
Mehenni family, the El-Bahty’s thought their daughter’s conversations were scripted and 
superficial. In mid-March 2014, Nora expressed a desire to come home and admitted she 




initially left France because she believed it was her duty to help those suffering in the 
Middle East. Now, however, she feared that she would never see her family again. Her 
family still seeks her return and prefers that she face legal consequences in France than 
the horrors of life with ISIL.294 
 Nora was young and vulnerable—only 15 years old—when she decided to 
migrate. She wanted to help suffering Muslims. More importantly, though, was her 
association with ISIL’s online propaganda and recruiters. Her second cell phone and 
Facebook account indicate she was hiding numerous conversations. For her to travel 
alone at such a young age, she must have received a lot of assurance that someone would 
assist her upon arrival in Istanbul. Recruiters most likely encouraged her and made her 
feel protected. Nora’s case implies that targeted recruitment and online propaganda were 
the strongest motivations for her migration. 
9. Conclusion 
The above case studies highlight common characteristics of migrants—such as 
age, education, and religious upbringing. Unfortunately, they do not demonstrate decisive 
trends or motives for migration. Instead, they illustrate how Western female migrants’ 
reasons for immigration are quite varied. The one common factor among all cases, 
however, is the use of the Internet and social media. These women routinely use Twitter, 
Facebook, and blogs to share pro-ISIL news, stories, pictures, and videos with friends, 
followers, and potential recruits. Thus, given the inability to identify conclusive trends 
from women’s backgrounds, the following section examines their social media 
interactions and includes a broader sample of European female migrants.  
Many scholars are analyzing women’s online communication to better understand 
life in the Caliphate and to determine self-identified reasons for migration. In addition, if 
an individual repeatedly discusses a topic, such as sisterhood, it could be her primary 
motive for supporting ISIL.  
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The quality and integrity of online sources must be questioned, though. Sahra 
Mehenni and Nora El-Bahty’s families felt their communication was scripted—not real. 
Indeed, ISIL has a propaganda agenda, and it undoubtedly only allows certain 
information and opinions to be disseminated online. Evaluating the reliability of social 
media is a difficult task and could be addressed in future studies. Assuming Western 
female migrants are freely managing their social media accounts, the following section 
highlights some of the principles commonly discussed. 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA MESSAGES 
ISIL’s sophisticated propaganda machine exerts cult-like control over its 
supporters and uses its successes—such as the case studies above—as recruitment 
tools.295 Essentially, these women become a critical component of ISIL’s propaganda 
campaign because they inspire and actively encourage others to migrate via social 
media.296 The authors of “Til Martyrdom Do Us Part” declare, “Much of this 
encouragement [by Western women] is subtle, achieved by representing daily life in ISIS 
territory in a positive light and by creating a vision of a utopian society in which their 
values are venerated and shared.”297 Therefore, following migrants’ social media 
transactions provides greater insight into women’s motivations and recruitment 
techniques.  
In early 2015, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue published “Becoming Mulan,” a 
report that tracked and analyzed the social media chatter of Western European female 
migrants who traveled to ISIL territory without a male escort. The study’s sample 
followed 12 women: 6 British, 2 Dutch, 1 French, 1 Canadian, 1 Austrian, and 1 
undetermined. Based on these women’s social media conversations, the study concluded 
that women migrate for various reasons. The four most common motives, however, were 
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to protect Islam, to build the Caliphate, to assert female identity, and to fulfill individual 
duty.298  
In addition to these four motives, Western female migrants repeatedly post 
comments online about Islamic sisterhoods and violence against the West. Finally, they 
routinely comfort each other by talking about the loss of family in the West and of 
husbands on the battlefield. These six reoccurring topics—to protect Islam and build a 
Caliphate, assert female identity, fulfill individual duty, gain sisterhood, justify violence, 
and recover from loss—are tenets of ISIL’s propaganda and are reiterated via social 
media. As such, ISIL’s narratives are consistently reinforced and are successfully 
recruiting others to the Caliphate.  
1. Protecting Islam and Building the Caliphate 
Western female migrants express a deep concern for the future of Islam and 
appear convinced that non-Muslims are at war with Muslims. The authors of “Becoming 
Mulan” explain, “The women within our sample express their deep grievances at the 
treatment of Muslims across the world, and deplore the West’s foreign policy.”299 Within 
their sample, one woman wrote, “This is a war against Islam, so you are either with us or 
against us.”300 Another noted, “Their [kuffar] agenda is to destroy and prevent the 
awakening of Muslim Ummah [community].”301 Finally, one exclaimed, “How can you 
live amongst people who desire to get rid of Islam. . . Wallahi [I swear to God] these 
Kuffar and Munafiqeen [hypocrites] will do anything to cause the Muslimeen [Muslims] 
harm.”302 
To protect the faith, many Muslim women embrace the vision of the Caliphate. 
This holy state is perceived as a “safe-haven for those who wish to follow Islam in its 
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entirety.”303 One migrant noted, “We don’t resort to violence because of the wrong 
America has done. We are trying to build an Islamic state that lives and abides by the law 
of Allah.”304 Many women hope to contribute to this ideologically pure state; thus, they 
openly celebrate ISIL’s territorial gains and hope to fulfill their duties in this new 
society.305 
2. Fulfilling Individual Duty 
Female migrants are radicalized to believe that it is their religious duty to pledge 
allegiance to the Caliphate.306 One woman declared, “Hijrah [migration] is FARD [a 
duty]!”307 This duty secures the heavenly rewards of the afterlife;308 thus, another women 
explained that she had “no desire to live in this world as [her] aspirations are in the 
hereafter. . . we love death as you love life.”309  
Many women recruit by emphasizing individual duty and instilling feelings of 
guilt and shame in Muslim women who have not migrated to support jihad. For example, 
the Halane sisters use disgrace and embarrassment to successfully recruit other British 
women to ISIL territory.310 Zahra Halane praises jihad and shames Western Muslims 
who do not support it. She wrote, “No difference between one who abandons jihad 
without excuse when it is fard’ayn, and one who eats without excuse during the day in 
Ramadan,” and “Do you not find it disgusting how brothers back at home proper slander 
the mujahideens…thinking they’re the righteous ones.”311 ISIL relies on women to 
recruit other women, and their messages of guilt and shame are extremely powerful with 
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young females who yearn to belong—not to be ostracized or embarrassed by their peers. 
They strive for inclusion and desire to be a part of something special. 
3. Sisterhood 
Many women seek camaraderie, friendship, and belonging; thus, one of the 
strongest motivations for migration is the promise of Muslim sisterhood. Female bonds 
seem strong in ISIL territory; thus, ISIL women attract others by highlighting the 
importance of their friendships and sisterhoods.312 One migrant wrote, “MashaAllah 
[Bless the Lord] the sisterhood in Dawla is amazing, the bonding immediate and no fake 
relationship, based on love fillah only.”313 Migrant women write little about the Syrian 
and Iraqi women in the region, which suggests that most of their time is spent with other 
muhajirat (migrants).314 When speaking of the native women, however, Western 
women’s comments are generally positive, suggesting the women are welcoming and 
hospitable.315 Supported by sisters, many women also believe the Caliphate is a place to 
express their femininity.  
4. Asserting Female Identity 
Many women believe that Islamic extremism is a way to assert their identity. 
Deviating from Western notions of female empowerment, women assert their identity in 
the Caliphate by serving male warriors via domestic roles, marriage, and motherhood. In 
ISIL territory, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of women’s domestic 
roles.316 Many women migrate for marriage, an important transition from childhood to 
adulthood.317 They are naively drawn to the romantic images of the lion and lioness, 
symbolizing the woman finding a brave and noble husband.318 Numerous tweets talk 
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about being a righteous wife and raising righteous children in the faith. Women should be 
good mothers and obedient wives.319 One woman declared, “You may gain more ajr 
[reward] by spending years of sleepless nights by being a mother and raising your 
children with the right intentions and for the sake of Allah than by doing a martyrdom 
operation.”320  
These women understand and accept the risks their husbands assume as 
mujahideen. A woman’s social status, however, is elevated with the martyrdom of her 
husband.321 It is a privilege and honor for a man to sacrifice his life for the Caliphate; 
thus, husbands’ deaths are publicly glorified.322 Following the death of her husband, 
Zahra Halane wrote, “He was a blessing from Allah . . . may Allah accept my husband 
who got his shahadah [martyrdom] in Iraq.”323 Women are praised for being widows and 
perceived as strong and noble.  
5. Violence Against Apostates 
Another way for women to assert their female identity is to support and inspire 
violence against apostates. The 12 women studied in “Becoming Mulan” unequivocally 
praised violence, celebrated beheadings, and encouraged infinite brutality against 
apostates.324 To them, Sharia law was justice; many approve of and appear desensitized 
to horrific violence. One woman stated, “Beheading is halal [permissible under Islamic 
law]. Go kill yourself if you say it’s haram,” and another noted, “Uff! Some Muslims are 
condeming [sic] the slaughtering of a dirty U.S. kaafir. . . Pathetic! What pathetic 
Muslims.”325 After the beheadings of the American reporter Peter Kassig and Syrian 
hostages, one woman proclaimed, “So many beheadings at the same time, Allahu Akbar 
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[God is greatest], this video is beautiful #DawlaMediaTeamDoingItRight.”326 There was 
even a request for “more beheadings please!”327 
While women consistently express their deep antipathy for the West, their 
violence is not limited to this region.328 Many women also express disdain toward the 
Bashar al-Assad regime, Israel, and Shia Muslims. Messages declared, “Shias are not in 
the folds of Islam so the term ‘shia muslim’ makes no sense,” and “how filthy Jews 
slaugher [sic] day by day muslims in Gaza and Palestine just makes me so angry. 
InsAllah [God willing] soon the destruction will come.”329 The glorification of violence 
on social media strengthens ISIL’s propaganda and recruitment campaign; furthermore, it 
has the potential to inspire more violence around the world.330 
6. Coping With Loss of Family in the West 
Many Western Muslim families are appalled by ISIL’s violent ideology and 
construct practical obstacles, such as confiscating passports, and emotional barriers to 
deter their daughters’ migrations.331 To comfort and encourage other women that it is 
okay to abandon family in the West, many ISIL supporters reassure followers that the 
pain of leaving family is normal. They share mechanisms to cope with the pain and 
discuss the hardships associated with moving to a foreign land.332 They also advertise the 
rewards of a new family and an Islamic sisterhood. One woman wrote, “The family you 
get in exchange for leaving the ones behind are like the pearl in comparison to the Shell 
you threw away into the foam of the sea which is the Ummah [Muslim community]. The 
reason for this is because your love for one another is purely for the sake of Allah.”333 
                                                 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Ibid., 30. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid., 31. 
331 Ibid., 16–17. 
332 Ibid., 15. 
333 Ibid., 24. 
 62 
C. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this chapter, analyses of women’s background information 
and social media communication did not pinpoint a decisive answer to the research 
question; however, social media did provide insight into women’s values, beliefs, and 
perhaps their motives for migration. Moreover, it played a crucial role in radicalization, 
making it a vital element of ISIL’s recruitment success. In conclusion, it is important to 
note that the themes frequently discussed online—ideology, grievance toward the West, 
sisterhoods, and identity assertion—are all key tenets of ISIL’s overarching propaganda 
campaign. Thus, migrants not only fulfil domestic roles within the Caliphate, they also 





This thesis examined why Western European Muslim women—specifically 
French and British women—migrate to the Middle East to support ISIL. It outlined 
ISIL’s mission and women’s roles within the organization. Within that context, it studied 
five potential motives: grievances toward Western society, ideology, 
relationships/belonging, identity assertion, and targeted recruitment. The research 
illustrated that all five were rational explanations based on the women’s personal 
circumstances and needs. Now, this chapter closes with a brief review of the research 
findings, additional thoughts on the power of propaganda, and recommendations for 
future consideration. 
A. REVIEW 
No single factor presented itself as a definitive answer to the research question. 
Instead, analysis of women’s stories and social media interactions unveiled evidence to 
support all five motives. Ultimately, ISIL means something different to every woman. 
The authors of “Western Foreign Fighters” suggest that ideology and grievances toward 
the West’s discrimination of Muslims are key factors in radicalization.334 In contrast, 
Max Abrahms, an assistant professor of Political Science at Northeastern University, 
suggests that people seek camaraderie. He asserts that “people become terrorists not to 
achieve their organization’s declared political agenda, but to develop strong affective ties 
with other terrorist members. . . people participate in terrorist organizations for the social 
solidarity, not for their political return.”335 Thus, many recruits join extremist 
organizations for a sense of purpose, friendship, and adventure—not the political 
agendas.336 Finally, Scott Atran, a French and American anthropologist, explains, “What 
inspires the most lethal terrorists in the world today is not so much the Quran or religious 
teachings as a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes 
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of friends, and through friends, eternal respect and remembrance in the wider world.”337 
In summary, women and their motives are complex; thus, no single factor defines the 
problem. 
B. REALITY OF ISIL 
Of the five motives proposed, however, one deserves further attention. It is worth 
emphasizing the significance of ISIL’s targeted recruitment campaign in the West. In the 
case studies examined, the Internet and social media were the only fixed variables, and 
they played noteworthy roles in the women’s lives by recruiting and radicalizing them. 
ISIL’s propaganda is extremely powerful—so powerful that it masks and justifies 
the organization’s horrific reality. According to Mona Mahmood in the Guardian, life in 
ISIL territory is repressive and harsh for Sunni Muslim women; it is an inconceivable hell 
for those deemed “apostates.” Upon arrival, European women are forced to discard their 
jeans, heels, and t-shirts. Women in ISIL territory must be covered from head to toe and 
are only allowed to wear veiled, black abayas (long dresses) with gloves.338 The dress 
code is non-negotiable. Even female doctors and nurses must remain veiled while 
performing medical care—an uncomfortable and potentially dangerous situation. Most 
women are banished from schools, expelled from work, and told to remain “hidden.”339 
They are only allowed to leave home under exceptional circumstances, and when they go 
out, they must always be accompanied by a male guardian.340 ISIL’s cities are patrolled 
by the Hisbah, religious “accountability” police, who ensure citizens are acting according 
to Islamic law.341 Violators and their family members are subject to beatings, public 
humiliation, or fines.342 
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All women are restricted in the Caliphate; however, the most brutal, unimaginable 
treatment is reserved for apostates. On December 9, 2014, Sarah Margon, the Director for 
Human Rights Watch in Washington, DC, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and Syria. In her testimony, Margon 
explains that ISIL uses cruelty “to sow fear and subdue populations under its control.”343 
Minority groups are thereby thrust into “cramped detention, abuse, forced conversion, 
forced marriage, and sexual slavery” in the Caliphate.344 Female apostates, some as 
young as twelve years old, are systematically sold into slavery, routinely beaten, and 
repeatedly raped by ISIL fighters who are encouraged in their actions.345 ISIL leaders 
have used the Quran and other religious rulings to rationalize violence and “celebrate 
each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.”346 Likewise, Amnesty 
International reports that women are victims of “unlawful execution-style killings” for 
criticizing or disobeying ISIL’s orders.347 
The reality of life in ISIL territory is not a secret. It is illustrated in the news and 
addressed in government meetings. Yet, despite the organization’s blatant intolerance, 
violent practices, and gross violations of civil liberties, it still attracts Western females—a 
testament to its marketing scheme. The psychological and emotional effects of ISIL’s 
ideological narrative, online propaganda, and targeted recruitment cannot be overstated. 
As Internet and social media access continues to grow, there is a greater need to study 
online radicalization and develop effective counter-narratives. 
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C. RECOMMENDATION: EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES 
As discussed in Chapter II, the West has been slow to challenge ISIL’s 
propaganda. Most efforts have lacked the necessary resources or expertise—resulting in 
an “investment without a return.”348 To counter ISIL’s powerful narratives, the West 
must understand them. According to Monitor 360, a narrative analytics and strategy 
company, ISIL’s narratives contain several ideological tenets from Al Qaeda in Iraq; 
however, the organization has also developed new grievances to attract a younger Sunni 
audience. These narratives continue to entice local and foreign populations, particularly 
young people who have never experienced legitimate state services.349 For example, an 
18 year old Iraqi male has known war for two thirds of his life. It is unlikely he 
remembers an effective government or functional state services, such as police or 
military. Consequently, ISIL’s promises of law, order, and justice are celebrated changes 
to the younger generation.350  
ISIL’s takfiri ideology, expressed in its narratives, resonates with Muslims 
seeking a strong, Islamic state. ISIL believes in fighting at home—whereas Al Qaeda 
attacked on Western soil. It encourages its members to target and kill apostates—
including other Muslims. It identifies the West as a “villain”—the enemy that constantly 
persecutes Muslims worldwide.351 It glorifies the Caliphate and the Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi. According to Monitor 360, “This narrative leverages feelings of economic 
disenfranchisement and social exclusion of Muslim communities in the West to promote 
the Caliphate as a place where they have a purpose and are part of a broader transnational 
movement.”352  
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Counter-narratives are crucial in the war against Islamic extremism. Monitor 360 
declares, “The success of the U.S. strategy to reverse ISIL’s territorial gains and popular 
appeal in the Middle East will depend in large part on the development of an effective 
counter-narrative strategy to combat the wider ISIL threat.”353 As previously mentioned, 
Western counter-narratives should disprove or undermine ISIL’s propaganda. According 
to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, successful counter-messages target an 
online audience, deny ISIL’s victory on the battlefield, highlight the infighting between 
Sunni jihadi groups, and showcase the organization’s abuse of and criminal behavior 
toward innocent populations.354  
This thesis recommends an additional approach. The West’s counter-narrative 
should consist of three elements. First, it needs to highlight the inherent risks of social 
media, with an emphasis on the dangers of anonymity. Too often, young men and women 
share personal information online with acquaintances– frequently people they have never 
met before. Moreover, they seek these people’s advice and approval. Unfortunately, 
many times, they do not really know who is on the other end of the account. As 
demonstrated earlier, ISIL thrives on fear and oppression; thus, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the female migrants who promote ISIL on Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr 
are forced to do so—or are not even women at all. The integrity of social media 
communication is certainly an area for future study. 
Next, counter-narratives must directly target women online. Just as ISIL’s Internet 
propaganda attracts Western Muslims via graphic videos and images, the West needs to 
show Western females what ISIL’s fighters are doing to innocent women and girls. 
Evidently, violence is an effective recruitment strategy. As such, crimes against women -- 
rape, slavery, and physical abuse—must be shown, not censored. Moreover, the counter-
narrative needs to emphasize that such behavior is not appropriate or legal—politically or 
religiously. Finally, counter-narratives should focus on the positive, what the West is 
for—such as freedom of religion and speech—not what it is against.355 Muslim women 
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need to believe they can have successful and faithful lives in the West. They must see 
images and stories of Western Muslim men and women raising strong families in the 
West—side by side with Christians and Jews. They need to hear Muslim women’s 
positive stories of religious, social, and economic success. Ideally, these three elements 
would deter women from Islamic extremism and guide them toward a more peaceful and 
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